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Matek v. Murat: Back to "Terms of
Agreement"
I. SYNOPSIS
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Securities & Exchange
Commission v . W.J. Howey Co.,1 the definition of "security" has
undergone many changes. The elasticity of this definition includes
within its scope investment contracts. By giving itself a broad defini-
tion to work with, the Court has, in effect, extended federal assis-
tance to those investors that previously may not have qualified for
federal remedies. Plaintiffs were understandably fond of this broad
definition. At the very least, it afforded them a valuable bargaining
tool. At best, it allowed the plaintiff to reap much larger awards.
Predictably, in the cases following Howey, it became a plaintiff's job
to convince the court that her particular contract satisfied the ele-
ments of an investment contract: an investment in a common enter-
prise in which the anticipated profits were to come solely from the
efforts of others.'
Eventually, this definition was expanded, albeit in dicta, to include
general partnership organizations. In Williamson v. Tucker,' the
Fifth Circuit added a new test to determine whether an interest in a
general partnership amounted to a security. The new test, consisting
of three prongs, looked not only at the agreement between the par-
ties, but also at the "economic realities" of their situation. In partic-
ular, the court focused on whether the investor was inexperienced
and unknowledgeable, and if the investor was so otherwise dependent
upon a unique capability of the managing partner that the investor
could not meaningfully exercise the powers of partnership.4
Recent evidence indicates that the expansion in this area may
have reached its limit. In 1988, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Matek v. Murat,5 ruled that the question whether an interest in a
1. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
2. This is the test enunciated by the Howey court. See infra note 12 and accom-
panying text.
3. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
4. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
5. 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988).
general partnership amounts to a "security" should be determined
only by the legal effect of the agreement between the parties.$ This
Note will analyze Matek in light of previous decisions from other
circuits. This Note will then attempt to determine the impact of
Matek on the field of securities regulation.
II. BACKGROUND
While both the Securities Act of 19337 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19348 define the term "security", 9 judicial construc-
tion is provided by the Supreme Court in Securities & Exchange
Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.10 In Howey, plaintiffs were investors
in units of a citrus grove developed and sold by defendant. Under
this investment scheme, a promoter owned half of the property and
offered parcels of the remaining half to the public. Nearly eighty-five
percent of the land was sold under a service contract in which a
second promoter assumed possession of the grove and became re-
sponsible to the purchaser only for the net profits derived therefrom.
The purchasers were not required, and in many cases were not able,
to care for the citrus groves themselves."
The Supreme Court considered the purchase contract and the ser-
vice contract to be essentially one agreement, and held that, as a
whole, it constituted an investment contract. The Court stated that
"an investment contract for the purposes of the Securities Act means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of a promoter or a third party."
12
Following Howey, the lower courts diligently applied their own
versions of the test to find "securities" in investment schemes involv-
ing real estate,13  limited partnerships,1 4  and even beaver
6. Id.
7. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982)).
8. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 78kk
(1982)).
9. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 states: "The term 'security' means
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness . . .invest-
ment contract. . .or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'secur-
ity,' or any certificate of interest or participation in. . .any of the foregoing." Section
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 uses almost identical language. The
Supreme Court has determined that the two statutory definitions are "substantially the
same." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. Id. at 295-96.
12. Id. at 298-99.
13. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed,
347 U.S. 925 (1954); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp.
81 (D.C. Mass. 1962).
14. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980)
(because a limited partnership, by definition, is an investment in a common enterprise
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breeding.15 The courts seized upon the remedial nature of the federal
securities legislation, determined to pursue a policy of broad protec-
tion for the public."' Such enthusiasm, however, has been less than
uniform when the courts ruled on the issue of general partnership
interests.
For example, to determine whether a security existed, courts from
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits limited their examination primarily to
the agreement between the parties. In Fargo Partners v. Dain
Corp. 7 the Eighth Circuit held that if the investor retained manage-
rial power by contract, there was no investment contract.'8 In Fargo,
plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase an apartment devel-
opment with defendant serving as its broker. Plaintiff had signed a
management agreement giving back to the defendant an exclusive
right to manage the apartment project, reserving for itself only the
right to cancel the agreement on thirty days notice. Plaintiff asserted
that it was merely an investor supplying capital and was completely
reliant upon the defendant for its managerial expertise.' 9
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the
contract did not amount to an investment contract within the mean-
ing of Howey. The court acknowledged that an investment contract
may be found even in those situations in which the investor has some
role to play,20 but found that the plaintiffs role was a "significant
one despite the management contract."'" By reserving the right to
cancel the management contract on thirty days notice, the court
found that plaintiff had, in fact, retained ultimate control over the
operation. In the court's view, the question was not whether plaintiff
chose to exercise its power. Rather, the controlling question was
with the profits coming solely from the efforts of others, it is an investment contract);
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978) (a limited partnership interest, under
state law, meets all the requirements of the Howey investment contract).
15. See Continental Mktg. Corp. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 387 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968) (defendant's brokerage of live bea-
vers constituted a violation of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934). A similar scheme was unearthed in Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir.
1979), in which the defendant was found to have violated securities laws by selling earth-
worms as investments.
16. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
17. 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 913-14.
20. Id. at 914. Here, courts have held that the Howey requirement-that profits
are to come solely from the efforts of others-is not to be strictly construed. See Miller v.
Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 416-17 (8th Cir. 1974).
21. Fargo, 540 F.2d at 915.
whether it had the power to exercise." The court also noted that
plaintiff was an experienced investor, having invested nearly three
million dollars in this venture alone. In addition, the court found that
plaintiff had failed to show that it was required to accept a "package
deal" by which it surrendered management rights. In this regard,
plaintiff had failed to show a substantial reliance on the efforts of a
third party for a return on its investment.23
The same year, the Tenth Circuit decided Ballard & Cordell
Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd.24 In that case, Zoller
& Danneberg, Inc. (ZDI), the defendant and counterclaimant, was
engaged in oil and gas exploration. In 1970, ZDI acquired a twenty-
five percent working interest in a well and participated in the drilling
on a joint venture basis with plaintiff Ballard & Cordell (B&C).
ZDI had entered into many similar operations in the past. Two years
later, B&C made a public offering for the sale of its fifty percent
interest in two producing wells. ZDI, which already owned twenty-
five percent in one of the two wells, entered into negotiations with
B&C for the purchase of its interest. Subsequently, however, ZDI
withdrew its offer, claiming that B&C had failed to provide mer-
chantable title. B&C sued for breach of contract. ZDI counter-
claimed, alleging that B&C had violated the securities laws.25
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's finding that no
investment contract had been created. The court considered "several
important factors, including the nature of the investor's financial and
managerial participation in the enterprise; the state of the investor's
knowledge, skill, and expertise concerning the enterprise; and
whether the investor is providing 'risk capital' to finance a specula-
tive venture." 26 It also agreed with the ruling by the trial court that
the transaction was a transfer of a leasehold right, rather than a
common venture, and that ZDI was both informed and skilled in the
exploration of oil and gas.
In 1981, the Fifth Circuit developed what was probably the most
definitive test for determining whether a general partnership interest
was a security. The Fifth Circuit articulated a three prong test in
Williamson v. Tucker2  that examined not only the four corners of
the partnership agreement, but the facts underlying the transaction
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 544 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1976); see also Mr. Steak, Inc., v. River City Steak,
Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) (restaurant franchise contract, in which the investor
did not have the right to direct the daily operations of the restaurant, but retained the
right to select the manager, did not constitute an investment contract).
25. Ballard, 544 F.2d at 1061-62.
26. Id. at 1065.
27. Id.
28. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
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between the parties and the comparative sophistication of the plain-
tiff investor. 9
In Williamson, plaintiffs were purchasers of joint venture interests
that included parcels of undeveloped real estate. The property, lo-
cated between Dallas and Fort Worth, was expected to appreciate
due to the construction of the planned Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
Airport. The property was marketed accordingly. Five years after
entering the joint venture, plaintiffs defaulted on their payments.
Plaintiffs then filed suit seeking rescission of the joint venture and
recovery of amounts already paid. In their complaint, plaintiffs as-
serted claims based on violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed
for want of federal subject matter jurisdiction.30
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit distinguished general partnerships
from the oil, gas, and real estate interests considered by the Eighth
and Tenth Circuits in Fargo and Ballard. General partnerships com-
plicated matters because, although the partnership may have full
ownership of the assets, "each individual partner has only his propor-
tionate vote in the partnership. '3 1 The court expressed concern that
an investment scheme hiding under the guise of a general partner-
ship might take advantage of "inexperienced and unknowledgeable
members of the general public." 2 To allay these fears, the court de-
veloped a test for an investor to show that an interest in a general
partnership amounted to a security. The investor must show that:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of
the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as
would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperi-
enced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intel-
ligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or
venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial
ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture
powers.33
Williamson was not important for its result,34 but rather for the rea-
29. Id. at 424.
30. Id. at 408-09. The district court also held that the joint venture interest was
not a security. Id. at 410.
31. Id. at 421. Still, the court recognized that even the individual partners "have
the sort of influence which generally provides them with access to important information
and protection against a dependence on others." Id. at 422.
32. Id. at 423.
33. Id. at 424.
34. The court did not, in fact, find that the plaintiffs' partnership interest
amounted to a security, but only that their claim was not foreclosed as a matter of law.
soning used to arrive at its result. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
plaintiffs had "an extremely difficult factual burden" to overcome if
they sought to prove that joint venture interests were securities. Nev-
ertheless, the court found that the district court had erred in dis-
missing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 5
III. MATEK V. MURAT
A. Facts
In 1979, defendant Joseph Murat bought an old Navy vessel with
the intent to convert it into a fish processing plant. Murat organized
a general partnership for the purpose of financing the project and
invited plaintiffs to invest in it. Twelve people each invested
$100,000 in order to finance construction on the vessel and provide
capital for the venture. The venture ultimately failed and creditors
foreclosed on loans made to the partnership.
In seeking redress for their losses, plaintiffs alleged, among other
things, violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Murat responded by asking the court for a ruling that the
plaintiffs' general partnership interests were not securities. The trial
court found that the partnership agreement did not constitute an in-
vestment contract and accordingly granted summary judgment for
defendant.3 6
B. Opinion
In affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment, the
Ninth Circuit noted that it had never before "directly faced" the
issue of whether an interest in a general partnership was a security."
It also noted that all courts which had confronted this issue, with the
exception of the Fifth Circuit, had uniformly held that general part-
nership interests were not securities, differing only as to the appro-
priate standard to examine such interests. 8
The court began its analysis by rejecting the "bright-line" rule
that the role of a general partner precludes, as a matter of law, a
finding that the investment was a security. 9 The court stated that
the test should be based upon the substance of the interest, rather
Id. at 425-26.
35. Id. at 425.
36. Matek, 862 F.2d at 723.
37. Id. at 725.
38. Id. at 726.
39. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
831 (1984) (a general partner's interest, by operation of state law, cannot amount to an
investment security).
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than its form.40 To do otherwise would be to ignore the "economic
reality" test required by the Supreme Court.4 The "economic reali-
ties" were that: "[a] nominal general partnership created pursuant
to state law may in reality operate more like a limited partnership,
the functional equivalent of a public offering of preferred stock."42
Moreover, the court disagreed with the inherent assumption of the
"bright-line" rule that participation in management guaranteed ac-
cess to information concerning the investment.43 As between mana-
gerial control and access to information, the latter was considered by
the court to be more important. 44
Although the Ninth Circuit in Matek did not accept the "bright-
line" test, it was also unwilling to fully adopt the three prong test set
forth by the Williamson court. The court found that Williamson
went "too far."'4" The court adopted the first part46 of the William-
son test, but rejected the other two parts because they created uncer-
tainty in the investment field: "An interest marketed as a general
partnership might be transformed into a security simply because its
holder is not diligent or knowledgeable in exercising his rights under
the agreement."4 The court noted that this could result in the
anomaly of courts finding "an investment a security in relation to
some investors and a partnership in relation to others. 48 Instead, the
court decided to follow the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, and held that
the true test of the interest was to be determined from the expecta-
tions of the parties and the terms in the contract.49
Applying this test to the facts, the Matek court found that the
partnership contract had allocated both managerial control and ac-
cess to information to the general partners. By the terms of the
agreement, no partner could withdraw capital without the consent of
all partners, nor could any partner lend partnership money without
40. Matek, 862 F.2d at 727.
41. The Supreme Court held that: "In considering these [investment] claims we
again must examine the substance-the economic realities of the transaction-rather
than the names that may have been employed by the parties." United Hous. Found., Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1974).
42. Matek, 862 F.2d at 727 (referring to Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Murphy,
626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1980)).
43. Id. at 728.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. This is the prong that examined how the agreement between the parties dis-
tributed the powers of partnership.
47. Matek, 862 F.2d at 729.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 729-30.
the consent of the majority. Although the agreement made defend-
ants the managing partners, it also specified that defendants were to
consult "as far as practicable" with the nonmanaging partners.50
These powers, which are more than those normally associated with
passive investors, led the court to conclude that the agreement was
one which provided the plaintiffs with "sufficient power to protect
their investments."51
IV. DisCUSSION
The Matek court's alignment with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
signals a clear break from the expansive rationale in Williamson.
However, the alignment was not complete. Unlike the other two cir-
cuits, the Ninth Circuit shifted the inquiry away from a plaintiff's
legal management powers to focus on whether a plaintiff has suffi-
cient access to information to protect his or her investment. Al-
though managerial control was still an important factor, the crucial
question was now whether there was adequate access to
information. 2
Under this analysis, an interest in a general partnership does not
become a security by virtue of the ignorance or helplessness of the
investor. Rather, the interest must be judged on its own merits. If it
is a security, it is so because the agreement severely restricts the
investor's power and access to information. Without this, the agree-
ment fails the test and would not, therefore, be subject to federal
securities regulation. This forces the court to consider only the legal
rights of the parties, and deems irrelevant any investigation into
whether the parties actually exercised those rights.
At least in theory, the Matek test is a compromise between the
decisions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and the Fifth Circuit.
While the Eighth and Tenth Circuits restricted the inquiry to
whether the plaintiff held managerial control, the Matek test allows
the plaintiff greater leeway. That is, if an investor can establish that
the agreement deprived him of access to investment information, the
agreement will be treated as a security interest notwithstanding the
fact it may have included certain managerial powers within its provi-
sions. The underlying rationale of this approach is that an unin-
formed investor will not be able to make any meaningful use of
whatever managerial powers he or she may possess. However,
pragmatically, it is difficult to see much difference between the
decisions.
One questions whether a person who has access to information but
50. Id. at 731.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 728.
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relatively limited managerial power is in a better position than one
who has managerial power but no access to information. In the for-
mer scenario, the person has access to information but is powerless
to exploit it. Thus, the information has minimal value. There is little
this person can do to cut losses except withdraw from the partner-
ship. While withdrawal may provide an adequate remedy in some
cases, it provides no opportunity for active participation by the
investor.
On the other hand, it might be argued that in the latter scenario,
the person who enjoys certain managerial powers, but has no access
to investment information, is in a better position than the person in
the former scenario. The latter investor might opt to withhold funds
or veto a resolution if he or she feels left out of the decisionmaking
process. In effect, the second investor's power, if sufficient, may pro-
vide access to information. However, this result assumes an investor
with some degree of sophistication. Moreover, the securities laws are
meant to protect unwary investors by providing access to investment
information. 53 In this respect, the Matek decision requiring adequate
access to information appears well grounded.
Matek's effect will be to limit claims of securities violations to
those instances in which a plaintiff can show that the terms of a
partnership agreement were so restrictive as to deprive the plaintiff
of investment information or powers of partnership. There will be no
federal remedy in those cases where a plaintiff is afforded partner-
ship powers and access to information, but refuses or fails to take
advantage of these rights. The courts will examine the facts on a
case-by-case basis, but only to the extent allowed by the terms of
each agreement. The Ninth Circuit will not examine whether the
plaintiff was particularly experienced in that area of investments or
whether the plaintiff in fact exercised those powers provided by the
agreement.
53. The need for full disclosure was an integral part of the 1933 Securities Act:
"Alluring promises of easy wealth were freely made with little or no attempt to bring to
the investor'9 attention those facts essential to estimating the worth of any security."
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (describing the conditions
leading to the Great Depression and the reasons for enacting the Act); see also Securities
& Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (a
"fundamental purpose" of the regulations was to promote "full disclosure" to protect the
buyer); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126-27 (1953)
(focusing on the knowledge of the offerees and the "protections afforded by
registration").
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the broad remedial purpose underlying federal securi-
ties regulations, it is foreseeable that, as the regulations are ex-
panded by case law, there will be instances in which the law will
reach too far. The law may then encompass cases which it was not
intended to remedy. A natural response to this overextension is to
halt, or at least slow, the expansion. Not every investment is made
under duress, nor should the Securities and Exchange Commission
be brought in to play every time someone loses money.54 This is espe-
cially true where people agree to form a partnership for the purpose
of making a profit.
The Matek decision served to consolidate, rather than expand, the
scope of securities regulation. It did so in two ways. First, the Matek
court followed the Eighth and Tenth Circuits by looking to the terms
of agreement between the parties to determine if the general part-
nership interest amounted to a security. Second, it shifted the focus
of its examination from managerial control to access to information.
This combination should effectively reduce unwarranted claims, and
yet remain faithful to the purpose behind securities regulations.
The Matek test will carefully avoid those situations where the
same instrument may be a security for one person, but merely an
interest in partnership for another. It returns the definition of secur-
ity to a somewhat more palpable state: a security is identifiable by
the characteristics of the instrument itself, rather than by the char-
acteristics of the purchaser.
JEFFREY D. WINTER
54. "[T]he anti-fraud provisions [of the securities regulations] were not intended
to remedy every instance of common law fraud. Nor are they to remedy every wrong that
occurs in a partnership scheme." Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted).
